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STATEMENT OF IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF
AMICUS CURIAE
The statement of identity and interest of amicus is set forth in the
Motion for Leave to File that was filed on February 28, 2018.
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Williams is serving a life without parole sentence based, in
part, on a burglary conviction committed when he was sixteen.1 Without
this counting as the first of three strikes, he would have faced a standard
range sentence of 53 – 70 months. See Br. of Pet’r, Appendix “A”
(Judgment and Sentence, Cowlitz County Superior Court, Cause No. 08-100735-6). Instead, the sentencing court had no choice but to count the
juvenile conviction as a strike under Washington’s Persistent Offender
Accountability Act (POAA), RCW 9.94A.555, .570, a sentencing scheme
that became law in 1994,2 long before the sea change of Roper,3 Graham,4
Miller,5 and Montgomery,6 as well as this Court’s extension of Miller and
Graham in State v. Bassett, 198 Wn. App. 714, 349 P.3d 430 (2017),
review granted, 402 P.3d 827 (2017) (argued Feb. 22, 2018). Graham and
Miller—as well as this Court’s article I, section 14 jurisprudence

Mr. Williams waived his declination hearing. Br. of Pet’r at 1.
The law was created by Initiative No. 539. See RCW 9.94A.555.
3 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2005).
4 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010).
5 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012).
6 Montgomery v. Louisiana, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 718, 193 L. Ed. 2d 599 (2016).
1
2

1

recognizing that the intrinsic nature of youth undercuts the penological
justifications for imposing the harshest sentences—require this Court to
engage with the constitutional dilemma that arises when the POAA
requires a sentencing court to impose life without the possibility of parole
on a defendant who committed one or more strike offenses as a juvenile.
Recognizing the constitutional dimensions of Mr. Williams’ case,
this Court requested on December 1, 2017, that counsel address at oral
argument whether “using a conviction that was committed when an
individual was under the age of 18 years old as a strike in a persistent
offender case violate[s] the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment?” Amicus demonstrates that the developments in juvenile
justice jurisprudence on both the federal and state level must be
recognized and integrated into review of a life sentence under the POAA
where a defendant committed one or more strike offenses as a juvenile.
The POAA as applied to Mr. Williams results in a mandatory sentencing
scheme under which the sentencing court cannot consider the defendant’s
youth and its attendant characteristics, in violation of the federal and state
constitutions.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
First, amicus explains that courts reviewing the constitutionality of
a life without parole sentence imposed under a recidivist statutory scheme
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routinely consider all strikes as part of the current offense. With respect to
the constitutional question posed, amicus explains how Mr. Williams’ life
without parole sentence runs afoul of the principles on which Graham and
Miller were decided. Graham not only barred the imposition of life
without parole on juvenile nonhomicide offenders, but also stands for the
larger principle that courts must closely scrutinize harsh punishments
imposed on juveniles, due to their diminished moral culpability. And
Miller prohibits mandatory life with parole sentencing schemes for
juvenile homicide offenders, as those schemes deprive courts of the
opportunity to consider the mitigating qualities of youth. Together,
Graham and Miller lead to the conclusion that a three strikes law that
imposes life without parole based, in part, on conduct committed as a
juvenile, is unconstitutional.
Second, amicus explains how Mr. Williams’ life without parole
sentence is unconstitutional under article I, section 14. This Court adopted
a categorical bar on juvenile life without parole in Bassett because
traditional proportionality analysis under State v. Fain, 94 Wn.2d 387, 617
P.2d 720 (1980), does not “adequately address the special concerns
inherent to juvenile sentencing.” Bassett, 198 Wn. App. ¶ 49. While Mr.
Williams was not a juvenile at the time of the third strike, his age at the
time of the first strike is material to the larger constitutional inquiry, as

3

those same “special concerns” are at play. The only way to avoid the risk
that harsh punishment might be imposed on those whose strike offenses
reflect transient immaturity is to adopt a corollary of the categorical bar on
juvenile life without parole: that no offense committed as a juvenile can
count as a strike.
ARGUMENT
I.

WASHINGTON COURTS HAVE LONG CONSIDERED
ALL STRIKES IN REVIEWING A LIFE SENTENCE
UNDER PERSISTENT OFFENDER SENTENCING
SCHEMES.
In Washington, long-standing precedent demonstrates that a court

reviewing the constitutionality of a life without parole sentence imposed
under a persistent offender statute considers all strikes that underlie the
sentence.7 In the watershed case of Fain, in which our supreme court
considered the proportionality of a life sentence under the habitual
offender statute in effect in 1980, the court looked at the nature of “each of
the crimes that underlies his conviction as a habitual offender” in
determining whether Mr. Fain’s sentence was proportional. 94 Wn.2d at
397-98 (emphasis added) (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 295,

7

This Court requested supplemental briefing on November 15, 2017, on the issue of
whether Mr. Williams may collaterally attack his 1997 conviction. While the parties
have ably responded to the Court’s inquiry, amicus provides a brief discussion of
how consideration of all strike offenses is necessary at the time a court sentences a
defendant under a persistent offender statutory scheme.

4

100 S. Ct. 1133, 63 L. Ed. 2d 382 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting))
(considering that each of the crimes underlying his life without parole
sentence were victimless and involved fraud to obtain small sums of
money). Rather than amounting to a collateral attack on the earlier strike
convictions, the consideration of the conduct underlying the prior strike
convictions is—and has been—central to proportionality review under
article I, section 14. Failure to scrutinize Mr. Williams’ prior strikes would
be an abdication of this Court’s duty to ensure that a life without parole
sentence does not violate either the Eighth Amendment or article I, section
14, and that analysis necessarily encompasses a consideration of all
criminal conduct that forms the basis for a life without parole sentence
under the POAA.
II.

THE PERSISTENT OFFENDER ACCOUNTABILITY ACT
LEAVES SENTENCING COURTS WITH NO DISCRETION
TO CONSIDER THE MITIGATING QUALITIES OF
YOUTH, IN VIOLATION OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT.
While Roper, Graham, and Miller reflect a sea change in the

sentencing of juvenile offenders, the principles on which the Supreme
Court rested its holdings apply with equal force when an adult sentencing
scheme imposes harsh punishment based, in part, on past juvenile criminal
conduct. Amicus discusses these principles to demonstrate that a life

5

without parole sentence under the POAA cannot rest upon a conviction for
a crime committed as juvenile.8
A. The Principles that Drove the Decision in Graham Apply in
Other Sentencing Contexts Where Punishment Is Imposed
Because of Juvenile Criminal Conduct.
In Graham, the Court held life without parole for juvenile
nonhomicide offenders was categorically barred.9 560 U.S. at 82. It
explained that “[a]n offender’s age is relevant to the Eighth Amendment,
and criminal procedure laws that fail to take defendants’ youthfulness into
account at all would be flawed.” Id. at 76. In determining that life without

8

Consideration of this constitutional argument does not raise the problem of a mixed
petition. Cf. In re Hankerson, 149 Wn.2d 695, 697, 72 P.3d 703 (2003) (if a PRP
filed after the one year period expires contains multiple claims, and one or more of
the claims is time barred, the entire petition must be dismissed as a mixed petition).
Here, neither argument is time-barred. Mr. Williams’ jurisdictional argument is not
subject to the one year bar, as he alleged that the Thurston County Superior Court
sentence imposed for first degree burglary in 1997 was “in excess of the court’s
jurisdiction,” RCW 10.73.100(5), as that court’s failure to conduct a declination
hearing and make findings on the record deprived that court of jurisdiction to
sentence him. Br. of Pet’r at 5-7. Mr. Williams has alternatively argued that the
failure to conduct a declination hearing and make findings on the record renders the
one year time bar inapplicable, because 1997 judgment and sentence for the burglary
conviction is not “valid on its face and…[was not] rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction.” RCW 10.73.090. Br. of Pet’r at 20. Nor is the argument that RCW
9.94A.570 is unconstitutional as applied to Mr. Williams subject to the one year bar
of RCW 10.73.090. RCW 10.73.100(2) (one year bar does not apply if defendant’s
petition is based on argument that the statute “defendant was convicted of violating
was unconstitutional on its face or as applied to the defendant's conduct.”).
9 The categorical proportionality analysis begins with objective indicia of national
consensus with regard to the sentencing practice in question, Graham, 560 U.S. at
62, and then requires judicial exercise of independent judgment to consider the
culpability of the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and characteristics, along
with the severity of the punishment in question,” id. at 67. Categorical
proportionality also examines the penological justifications for the sentencing
practice, including incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation. Id. at 71.

6

parole was categorically barred for juvenile nonhomicide offenders, the
Graham court relied on juveniles’ lessened culpability and noted that a
juvenile’s transgression “is not as morally reprehensible as that of an
adult.” Id. at 68 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835, 108
S. Ct. 2687, 101 L. Ed. 2d 702 (1988) (plurality opinion)). The Graham
Court affirmed that “[i]t remains true that “[f]rom a moral standpoint it
would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an
adult.” Id. at 68 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570).
The Supreme Court’s decision to ban juvenile life without parole
for juvenile nonhomicide crimes is based on “these fundamental
differences [that] cannot logically be limited to the analysis of some legal
issues but not others because these are fixed characteristics of
adolescence.” Beth Caldwell, Twenty-Five to Life for Adolescent
Mistakes: Juvenile Strikes As Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 46 U.S.F.
L. Rev. 581, 604 (2012). Indeed, the Supreme Court has relied on its
conclusions regarding the fixed characteristics of adolescence, recognizing
the relevance of age in conducting the Miranda10 custody analysis. J.D.B.
v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 264–65, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 180 L. Ed. 2d
310 (2011). The Court’s decision in J.D.B. “reflects a commitment to its

10

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).

7

conclusions regarding the nature of adolescence and a willingness to apply
research regarding characteristics of adolescents to constitutional legal
issues impacting this population.” Caldwell, supra at 605.
Like the sentencing procedures in Graham, the POAA is a
sentencing procedure that fails to take youth into account, in contravention
of Graham. And as the J.D.B. Court noted, there is no need to revisit the
underpinnings of the “commonsense conclusions” about the nature of
juveniles. 564 U.S. at 272 (finding no reason to “reconsider” the
observations about the common “nature of juveniles” (quoting Graham,
560 U.S. at 68)). Instead, it is the duty of courts to consider the application
of these commonsense conclusions in new contexts, and amicus urges the
Court to do exactly that in Mr. Williams’ case. The central principle in
Graham—that juveniles are intrinsically less culpable than adults—casts
significant doubt on the constitutionality of using a strike committed as a
juvenile to support a life without parole sentence. See Caldwell, supra, at
605 (noting that it would be “inconsistent to ignore [Graham’s]
conclusions in the legal analysis of the constitutionality of using juvenile
strikes”).

8

B. The POAA Is a Mandatory Sentencing Scheme that Removes
Youth from the Balance, in Violation of Miller’s Central
Principle that Youth Mitigates Culpability.
Miller teaches that courts must give exacting scrutiny to mandatory
penalty schemes that impose punishment without appropriate
consideration of youthfulness. See generally 567 U.S. 460. The Miller
Court extended its holdings in Roper and Graham to hold that “penalty
schemes” that include mandatory life-without-parole sentences for
juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment because they impose harsh
sentences without appropriate consideration of the youthfulness of the
defendant. Id. at 474. “By removing youth from the balance,” the
mandatory schemes the Court invalidated “prevent[ed] the sentencer from
taking into account [the] central considerations” identified in Graham. Id.
Because of juveniles’ lessened moral culpability and enhanced prospect of
reformation, the penological justifications for imposing the harshest
sentences on juveniles are diminished. See id. at 472.
The POAA is a mandatory penalty scheme that imposes
punishment without appropriate consideration of youthfulness of one or
more of the strikes, in contravention of Miller’s central principle. While it
is indisputable that Mr. Williams was sentenced to life without parole
when he was an adult, the reach of Miller cannot be so easily limited. The
sentence imposed on Mr. Williams is as much a punishment for the first

9

strike committed at the age of sixteen as it is for the other two strikes
committed as an adult. But under the POAA, the trial court had no
discretion to consider the characteristics of youth that undercut the
justification for imposing the harshest sentence short of capital
punishment. Miller therefore counsels that Mr. Williams should not serve
a life sentence based, in part, on criminal conduct committed as a juvenile.
Some federal courts have applied the principles in Roper, Graham,
and Miller to recidivist statutes, recognizing the diminished culpability of
juvenile offenders in this context. In United States v. Howard, 773 F.3d
519, 529, 531-32 (4th Cir. 2014), the court determined that the life
sentence imposed under the de facto career offender provision of the
federal sentencing guidelines was substantively unreasonable, because
some of the predicate convictions were committed when Howard was
between sixteen and eighteen. The trial court had based its upward
departure on Howard’s conviction, at the age of sixteen, for selling
cocaine to an undercover officer, and on his conviction, at the age of
eighteen to voluntary manslaughter.11 Id. at 529. Invoking Miller,
Graham, and Roper, the court vacated Howard’s sentence as substantively

11

Other juvenile criminal convictions the trial court noted were providing fictitious
information to a police officer, when Howard was seventeen, and second degree
trespass and possession of cocaine, although these did not appear to be the basis on
which the trial court justified its upward departure. Id. at 531.
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unreasonable, relying on the Supreme Court’s recognition of “the
diminished culpability of juvenile offenders, given their lack of maturity,
vulnerability to social pressures, and malleable identities.” Id. at 532
(citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 471; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; Roper, 543 U.S.
at 569-70). The court criticized the district court’s sentence for its failure
to appreciate “what we cannot ignore…that youth is a ‘mitigating factor
derive[d] from the fact that the signature qualities of youth are transient; as
individuals mature, the impetuousness and recklessness that may dominate
in younger years can subside.’” Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).12

12

Other federal courts, deciding cases before Miller, have reached different results.
United States v. Graham, 622 F.3d 445, 457 (6th Cir. 2010) (determining a prior
felony drug conviction committed when defendant was seventeen counted as
qualifying felony under the three-strikes provision of the Controlled Substances Act,
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)); United States v. Scott, 610 F.3d 1009 (8th Cir. 2010)
(same). Both the Graham court and the Scott court unpersuasively distinguished
Graham v. Florida based on the fact that the defendants were adults at the time of the
commission of the third strike offense. Graham, 622 F.3d at 462 (noting that Graham
was an adult when he received the mandatory life term); Scott, 610 F.3d at 1018
(same). The juvenile defendants in both Roper and Graham were charged, tried, and
convicted as adults. Graham, 560 U.S. at 53 (“Graham’s prosecutor elected to charge
Graham as an adult.”); Roper, 543 U.S. at 557 (“[Simmons] was tried as an adult.”).
The dissent in United States v. Graham, however, foreshadowed the Fourth
Circuit’s result in Howard, arguing that the majority’s decision “violates sound
principles of penological policy based on the Eighth Amendment values recently
outlined by the Supreme Court in Graham v. Florida,” 622 F.3d at 465 (Merrit, J.,
dissenting), and that Graham “should at least make our court and the court system
more sensitive to the important distinction between juvenile and adult criminal
conduct,” id. at 469.
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Further, our Supreme Court’s decision in State v. HoustonSconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1, 391 P.3d 409 (2017), signals that Washington
courts will interpret the Eighth Amendment to ensure that the principles
that drove the specific holdings in Roper, Graham, and Miller continue to
have vitality in sentencing contexts not originally addressed by those
specific cases.13 The court in Houston-Sconiers expanded Miller by
declaring that a court’s ability to fully address the mitigating qualities of
youth requires absolute discretion to depart from sentencing guidelines
(including the mandatory sentencing enhancements specifically at issue in
the case) when sentencing juveniles to lengthy sentences under adult
sentencing schemes. 188 Wn.2d at 21.
III.

ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 IS MORE PROTECTIVE THAN
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT IN THE JUVENILE
SENTENCING CONTEXT, AND SO SHOULD NOT
PERMIT OFFENSES COMMITTED AS A JUVENILE TO
COUNT AS A STRIKE.
While Eighth Amendment jurisprudence brings into relief the

constitutional infirmity of sentencing Mr. Williams to life without parole

In State v. O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680, 688–98, 358 P.3d 359 (2015), this Court
further extended Miller when it allowed the youth of an adult offender to be
considered as a justification for departures below the standard sentencing range, in
recognition that the juvenile brain is not fully developed by the age of eighteen. See
also Bassett, 198 Wn. App. ¶ 46 (discussing O’Dell). While Mr. Williams’ second
strike was not committed when he was a juvenile, Mr. Williams was still youthful—
23 years old—at the time of his 2004 strike offense. O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d at 695
(noting studies suggesting that the diminished culpability of youth is applicable until
age 25, when the juvenile brain matures); Reply Br. of Pet’r, App’x B.
13

12

based in part on a crime committed as a juvenile, the infirmity is even
more pronounced under the more protective article I, section 14. Article I,
section 14 jurisprudence explicitly forbids the risk of imposing life
without parole on those whose crimes reflect transient immaturity, and it is
under article I, section 14 that the resolution is found. A corollary to the
categorical bar on juvenile life without parole announced in Bassett is that
no strike offense committed as a juvenile may count as a strike under the
POAA.14
A. Article I, Section 14 Is More Protective than the Eighth
Amendment.
Our state constitution robustly protects against cruel punishment,
State v. Witherspoon, 180 Wn.2d 875, 887, 329 P.3d 888 (2014), and
implicit in that protection is the continuing duty of Washington courts to
develop article I, section 14 jurisprudence to ensure that it remains more
protective than the Eighth Amendment. And since our supreme court in
Fain declared article I, section 14 to be more protective, 94 Wn.2d at 392–
93, Washington courts have continued to so hold in a variety of sentencing

14

This Court could determine that the practice of allowing one or more strike offense
committed as a juvenile to support a life without parole sentence under the POAA
violates the Eighth Amendment. However, amicus urges this Court to do so
specifically under Bassett and article I, section 14. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,
1041-42, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201 (1983).
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contexts.15 So while there is disagreement among federal courts as to
whether strike offenses committed as juveniles may count as strikes, supra
at 10-11, there is ample room to reach a different, more protective rule
under article I, section 14. Cf. Bassett, 198 Wn. App. at ¶ 18.
B. Fain Proportionality Review Does Not Take into Account the
Youth of the Offender, in Violation of Miller, Graham, and
Article I, Section 14.
Proportionality analysis under Fain,16 94 Wn.2d 387, considers the
crime and the sentence, but does not technically take into account the

15

For persistent offender cases, see State v. Witherspoon, 180 Wn.2d 875, 887, 329
P.3d 888 (2014); State v. Manussier, 129 Wn.2d 652, 674, 921 P.2d 473 (1996);
State v. Rivers, 129 Wn.2d 697, 712, 921 P.2d 495 (1996); State v. Thorne, 129
Wn.2d 736, 772, 921 P.2d 514 (1996). For death penalty cases, see State v. Roberts,
142 Wn.2d 471, 506, 14 P.3d 713 (2000); State v. Bartholomew, 101 Wn.2d 631,
639, 683 P.2d 1079 (1984). For consecutive sentences, see Wahleithner v. Thompson,
134 Wn. App. 931, 936, 143 P.3d 321 (Div. I 2006). For cases indirectly supporting
the conclusion that article I, section 14 provides greater protection than the Eighth
Amendment, see In re Rupe, 115 Wn.2d 379, 396 n.5, 798 P.2d 780 (1990) (in the
death penalty context, noting article I, section 14’s greater protection); In re
Johnston, 99 Wn.2d 466, 478, 663 P.2d 457 (1983) (in a medical license denial case,
citing Fain as an example of article I, section 14 providing broader protection than
the Eighth Amendment); State v. Grenning, 142 Wn. App. 518, 545–46, 174 P.3d
706 (Div. II 2008) (performing a Fain analysis in the consecutive and concurrent
sentencing context to determine whether the sentence violated article I, section 14
and the Eighth Amendment); In re Haynes, 100 Wn. App. 366, 375–76, 996 P.2d 637
(Div. I 2000) (in the exceptional sentencing context, indirectly affirming the
proposition by performing a Fain analysis to determine whether the sentence violated
both article I, section 14 and the Eighth Amendment).
16 Fain proportionality analysis considers whether a particular punishment is
disproportionate to the crime. 94 Wn.2d at 397–401. That four-factor test examines
1) the nature of the offense, 2) the legislative purpose behind the statute, 3) the
punishment the defendant would have received in other jurisdictions for the same
offense, and 4) the punishment meted out for other offenses in the same jurisdiction.
Id.; cf. State v. Rivers, 129 Wn.2d 697, 713, 921 P.2d 495 (1996) (replacing the
second factor with “the legislative purpose behind the statute” when the test is used
outside the habitual offender context).
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personal characteristics of the offender, as required by Miller. 567 U.S. at
470–79. As this Court noted in Bassett, the first Fain factor focuses on the
characteristics of the crime, and not, as Miller requires, on the mitigating
qualities that flow from the offender’s youth. Bassett, 198 Wn. App. at
738 (citing Fain, 94 Wn.2d at 397-98). This Court similarly noted that the
fourth Fain factor, which considers the punishment meted out in other
jurisdictions, conflicts with Miller because it “allows comparison with the
punishment for adult offenders who commit the same crimes.” Id.
(emphasis in original). Because Fain proportionality analysis does not
allow for consideration of the mitigating qualities of youth, applying this
analysis to life without parole sentences based in part on juvenile strike
offenses would violate Miller and the Eighth Amendment, in addition to
article I, section 14.
C. This Court’s Independent Judgment Analysis from Bassett
Yields a Corollary of the Categorical Bar Against Juvenile
Life Without Parole.
This Court has taken the important step of recognizing that article
I, section 14 is more protective in the juvenile sentencing context by
categorically barring juvenile life without parole, fully embracing the
precept that “children are constitutionally different” and acting to address
the significant risks of applying adult sentencing procedures to juveniles.
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Because this Court’s categorical bar analysis17 in Bassett largely informs
the analysis here, amicus discusses the emerging national consensus
against use of juvenile strikes to support sentencing enhancements and
argues that this Court’s independent judgment is every bit as salient to this
particular sentencing context as it was to the Miller-fix statute at issue in
Bassett.
i.

National consensus
Professor Beth Caldwell’s recent analysis of whether states with

harsh recidivist statutes18 permit the use of juvenile adjudications as prior
convictions to enhance sentences under recidivist statutory schemes
determined that such a national consensus exists. Caldwell, supra, at 61725. As of 2012, ten states explicitly exclude use of juvenile adjudications
as prior convictions for three strikes sentencing. Id. at 619 n.240 (citing
jurisdictions). Ten additional jurisdictions’ statutes “most likely prohibit
the use of juvenile adjudications as strikes.” Id. at 619 n.241. Thirteen

Washington’s categorical bar analysis determines whether a particular punishment
against a certain class of people is constitutionally barred given the nature of the
offense or the characteristics of that class of offenders. State v. Schmeling, 191 Wn.
App. 795, 799, 365 P.3d 202 (2015). This two-step analysis considers 1) whether
there is a national consensus against the sentencing practice at issue, and 2) the
independent judgement of the court, based on its precedent, as to whether the
punishment is unconstitutional. See id. at 799–800.
18 Defined as allowing sentences anywhere from 15 years to life. Caldwell, supra at
618. Other jurisdictions have less severe statutory schemes that permit judicial
discretion or impose far less severe sentences. Id.
17

16

additional states appear to prohibit the use of juvenile adjudications as
strikes through case law. Id. at 620 n.244. In total, as of 2012, thirty-three
states most likely prohibit the use of juvenile adjudications to count as
“strikes.”
While states’ approaches to use of adult convictions of juvenile
offenders count as strikes vary more than the use of juvenile adjudications,
Caldwell notes that there may be an “emerging national consensus against
using adult convictions of juvenile offenders for sentencing
enhancements.” Id. at 628; see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 566 (it is the
“consistency of the direction of change” rather than a static examination of
the law at any particular point that is relevant (quoting Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304, 315, 122 S. Ct. 2442, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335 (2002)). In 2012,
Caldwell identified at least eight jurisdictions that “prohibit or limit the
circumstances under which convictions of juvenile offenders in adult court
may be used for future sentencing enhancement under three strikes laws.”
Id. at 628 n.282.19 Since then, at least one state, Wyoming, as part of its
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These eight jurisdictions break down into two categories. Kentucky, New Jersey,
New Mexico, North Dakota, and Oregon expressly limit or exclude the use of
juvenile convictions as strikes. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.080(2)(b), 3(b) (West
2012); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:44-7 (West 2005); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-18-23(C)
(2010); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-32-09 (1997 & Supp. 2011); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
161.725 (2011). Alabama, New York, and Wisconsin do not allow the use of
youthful offender convictions of juveniles in adult court as strikes. Ex parte Thomas,
435 So. 2d 1324, 1326 (Ala. 1982); N.Y. Penal Law § 60.10 (McKinney 2009); State
v. Geary, 95 Wis. 2d 736, 289 N.W.2d 375, 1980 WL 99313 (Ct. App. 1980).
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Miller fix statute, not only eliminated juvenile life without parole, but also
excluded convictions of juveniles in adult court from counting as strike
offenses under its habitual offender statute. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10201(b)(ii) (2013) (permitting life without parole for three strikes only after
three or more previous convictions for “offenses committed after the
person reached the age of eighteen (18) years of age.”); see also 2013
Wyo. Sess. Laws 75 (showing Miller fix along with revision to habitual
offender statute).20
The determination of a national consensus is not determinative of
whether a practice violates article I, section 14. Bassett, 198 Wn. App. ¶
52. Rather, the Court also employs its independent judgment.
ii.

Independent judgment
In “exercising independent judgment, we consider ‘the culpability

of the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and characteristics, along
with the severity of the punishment in question.’” Id. ¶ 32 (quoting State v.
Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 386 (Iowa 2014) (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at
67). In Bassett, this Court’s independent judgment of whether article I,
section 14 permitted juvenile life without parole focused on the
“unacceptable risk that juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect transient
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http://legisweb.state.wy.us/2013/Session Laws.pdf.

18

immaturity will be sentenced to life without parole or early release
because the sentencing court mistakenly identifies the juvenile as one of
the uncommon, irretrievably corrupt juveniles.” Id. ¶ 59. While the POAA
does not give sentencing courts any discretion to consider whether a
juvenile strike reflects the “uncommon, irretrievably corrupt juvenile[]”,
id., the exercise of that discretion in the POAA context would lead to the
same risk already identified as unacceptable. Therefore, the only way to
ensure that Mr. Williams, and others like him who committed strike
offenses as juveniles, do not end up serving life without parole based in
part on “crimes [that] reflect transient immaturity,” id., is to adopt the
corollary proposed by amicus: that no juvenile strike offense may count as
a strike under the POAA.21
CONCLUSION
Amicus respectfully argues that Graham and Miller, together with
our more protective article I, section 14, counsel that any time juvenile
conduct triggers adult sentencing schemes, judicial scrutiny is required to
ensure that the harshest of punishments are not imposed on those who are
inherently less culpable. Amicus suggests that this Court’s decision in
Bassett obviates the need for a formal categorical bar analysis in Mr.

21

This would also be a logical extension of Washington law that does not allow
juvenile adjudications to count as strikes. RCW 9.94A.030(35), (38); see also State v.
Knippling, 166 Wn.2d 93, 98-102, 206 P.3d 332 (2009).
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Williams’ case. Instead, if the principles of the diminished culpability of
youth are to have continuing vitality, those same principles that drove
adoption of the categorical bar against life without parole in Bassett lead
to a corollary of the categorical rule here—that under article I, section 14,
no offense committed as a juvenile can count as a strike.
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